Opinion: Election results signal bright future for Cambodia's economy
Written by Benny Widyono
Monday, 11 August 2008
The landslide victory of the Cambodian People's Party at the July 27 elections, in which it is expected once official results are released to have won 90 seats out of 123, a gain of 17 seats from the 2003 election, bodes well for the future of Cambodia and it will bolster the 23-year rule of Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, who is considered a fulcrum of economic stability.
Hun Sen's victory, the third since UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia) conducted elections in 1993, carries a special significance.
It is the first election under the constitutional amendment of March 2, 2006, requiring only a simple majority, 50 percent plus one, rather than the unwieldy two-thirds majority laid down in the Constitution adopted after the UNTAC elections.
This time, CPP won at the expense of Funcinpec, the royalist party, which had won the UNTAC-administered elections in 1993, and has now practically disappeared from the radar screen, obtaining only two seats. The main opposition party is now the Sam Rainsy Party, which gained 26 seats, three more than in 2003.
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Cambodia has an $8-billion economy, but this could easily be a $100-billion economy within another 10 to 20 years, providing stability continues.
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The landslide victory can no doubt be attributed to rapid economic progress since the UNTAC elections of 1993, driven by four Fs: foreign aid, foreign investment, foreign trade and foreign tourists.
Since 2004 Cambodia has become Asia's fastest growing economy after China. Starting from a low base, average annual growth rate during 2001-2006 was 9.9 percent compared with Asean's 6.5 percent. Everywhere one can see a rapidly emerging middle class living in ever better accommodations, reflecting the construction boom and rapidly escalating land prices, while more and more families are sending their children to public and an increasing plethora of private schools and universities.
In the last 10 to 15 years, the four Fs were augmented by a rapidly growing, vibrant and dynamic domestic sector.
An example can be found in Lucky enterprises, which during UNTAC days had a small store serving high-spending UNTAC personnel. Now Lucky boosts five supermarkets including one in Siem Reap and seven Lucky Burgers and Lucky Sevens.
FDI surge
In 2004, foreign direct investment began to surge from less than one percent to eight percent of GDP in 2007. Today, foreign investment is dominated by North Asia, particularly Korean companies who are building skyscrapers and condominium complexes. The growth of domestic enterprises has attracted American capital, including Leopard Capital, a private investment fund aimed at building a diversified portfolio of Cambodia's leading businesses in key sectors it has identified such as financial services, energy, telecoms, real estate, hotels, manufacturing, agribusiness and natural resources
After the UNTAC elections in 1993, the country was governed by two prime ministers, Prince Ranariddh, head of the royalist Funcinpec party who won the elections and Hun Sen of the CPP who came in a close second. Ironically, soon businessmen who flocked to Cambodia, as well as donor governments discovered that in order to get things done one should turn to the ex-Communist Hun Sen wing of the government rather than to the erratic and haphazard Ranariddh who headed the Royalist wing of the government.
Today, Cambodia has a US$8 billion economy - but this could easily be a $100 billion economy within another ten to 20 years, providing stability continues, and there is no reason to think it won't.
There are many other compelling reasons to invest in the country including a remarkably open economy, its central location as the epicentre of a fast growing region, no separatist movements, a young and hardworking population eager to learn new skills, and low labour costs.
Land boom
Let us look at some specifics. The property boom including the building of a great number of housing projects and malls have driven land prices sky high especially in the centre of Phnom Penh where land values rose from $500 a square metre in 2003 to over $3,000 today.
Many feel that this will be followed by a crash. However, look at the history at such countries like Thailand and Indonesia, who suffered a property bubble during the financial crisis of 1997, but have since continued to boom and are now at levels much higher than before the crisis.
The plans for a stock market to open its doors in 2009 will further boost the rapidly growing financial services sector attracting both domestic funds as well as international funds through mutual funds following the pattern of other Asian countries.
International banks have started to move in but there is room for much faster growth in this sector.
With economic stability assured, other internationally known banks will follow and move in.
Decades of fighting has had one consequence which makes Cambodia so desirable to investors: the availability of vast swathes of arable and fertile land just waiting to be cultivated for rice and other valuable cash crops for exports, agricultural materials including food processing is another untapped resource for growth.
Finally, in addition to Angkor Wat, Cambodia offers beautiful untouched beaches to attract tourists. Indeed, Cambodia is still relatively unexplored in tourism potential.
Overall, there is no doubt in my mind that the elections will usher in another five years of dynamic growth and stability in the country.
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Benny Widyono, Ph.D., was the UN secretary general's representative in Cambodia from March 1993 to May 1997.
He is a professor of economics at the University of Connecticut.
Friday, September 5, 2008
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Bangkok Book Launch
My book will be launched at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand next Tuesday, March 4, 2008, at 8 PM. Please come if you're in the city.
Review from South China Morning Post
South China Morning Post
Sunday, January 6, 2007
Asian history
Dancing In Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer rouge, and the United Nations in
Cambodia
By Benny Widyono
# Paperback: 312 pages
# Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (October 28, 2007)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0742555534
# ISBN-13: 978-0742555532
After two decades of war and genocide in Cambodia, the United Nations initiated its most ambitious peacekeeping mission in 1991 in a bid to end the conflict, organise elections and transform a one-party quasi-communist state into a liberal democracy.
The author was parachuted from his plush UN office in New York to operations in Siem Reap, far from basic comforts and convenience. His fascinating account reveals how he coped with potholed roads, an erratic power supply, political headaches and a deeply flawed UN mandate with considerable humour and rare commitment.
The flawed mandate passed on by the PP5 - the five members of the UN Security Council - could have resulted in his untimely death. In May 1993 an increasingly belligerent Khmer Rouge attacked and briefly occupied the town of Siem Reap in a defiant attempt to frighten voters and disrupt elections.
Although the Pol Pot faction had signed the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 together with the two non-communist factions and the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, they doggedly refused to permit UN access to their guerilla zones and continually obstructed the peace process.
UN battalions were helpless in the face of Khmer Rouge attacks. As Widyono points out, the UN Transitional Authority of Cambodia (Untac) had to appeal to the forces of Hun Sen's government, not officially recognised by the UN, to come and chase the Khmer Rouge soldiers out of town.
Amazingly the treaty made no provision for how to deal with any faction that violated its accords, much less any contingency plan to protect Cambodian civilians from the genocidal Pol Pot. Ordinary Cambodians had assumed that UN forces had come to Cambodia to protect them. But UN senior officials pointed out to this reviewer "it was not part of our mandate". They even had difficulties protecting themselves.
This insider's account provides fresh insights into another major controversy. How far was Untac supposed to take over from the incumbent government led by Hun Sen? The book clarifies the complexities, illusions and realities of power in Cambodia.
The arrangement was extremely complex, with authority vested in Untac and King Norodom Sihanouk, then the president of the Supreme National Council. But neither body was equipped or prepared to run the country during the period of preparation for free and fair elections.
Widyono soon grasped that only the incumbent government, which had presided over the rebirth of Cambodia since the Pol Pot nightmare, had the capacity to do this. Guerilla factions and some western governments never wanted to accept that reality.
Untac also had its successes. A mass refugee repatriation emptied all the camps in Thailand and brought Cambodians home in time for voting day. Numerous NGOs were set up and the seeds of pluralism and a free press were successfully cultivated. The first democratic election in Cambodian history took place thanks to the bravery and dedication of hundreds of UN
volunteers. That the UN did not achieve more in the way of delivering peace and justice was primarily owing to the drafting of the mandate.
In his capacity as the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Widyono returned to Cambodia some years after the end of Untac's mission. The book ends in 1997 with Hun Sen emerging triumphant from a showdown with Royalist armed forces in a tank battle in Phnom Penh.
The UN had been forced to dance to many different tunes. Dancing in the shadows of the killing fields, Untac was mandated to promote respect for human rights, yet paradoxically it was not allowed to investigate the Khmer Rouge regime of mass murder. Respecting Pol Pot as part of an inclusive peace process was a tune dictated by the US, Britain, France and China in the Security Council, with reservations from Russia only.
The UN military commander, General John Sanderson, berated journalists one night for highlighting the genocidal record of the Khmer Rouge, instead of focusing on Untac's drive for reconciliation among the four factions.
But unlike the Australian general, the author concludes that including the Khmer Rouge in the peace agreement was a huge blunder. He argues that they should have been put on trial like those who committed atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and not coddled by the UN.
Now, so many years later, the UN is finally backing a Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Phnom Penh. It's better late than never.
Sunday, January 6, 2007
Asian history
Dancing In Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer rouge, and the United Nations in
Cambodia
By Benny Widyono
# Paperback: 312 pages
# Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (October 28, 2007)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0742555534
# ISBN-13: 978-0742555532
After two decades of war and genocide in Cambodia, the United Nations initiated its most ambitious peacekeeping mission in 1991 in a bid to end the conflict, organise elections and transform a one-party quasi-communist state into a liberal democracy.
The author was parachuted from his plush UN office in New York to operations in Siem Reap, far from basic comforts and convenience. His fascinating account reveals how he coped with potholed roads, an erratic power supply, political headaches and a deeply flawed UN mandate with considerable humour and rare commitment.
The flawed mandate passed on by the PP5 - the five members of the UN Security Council - could have resulted in his untimely death. In May 1993 an increasingly belligerent Khmer Rouge attacked and briefly occupied the town of Siem Reap in a defiant attempt to frighten voters and disrupt elections.
Although the Pol Pot faction had signed the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 together with the two non-communist factions and the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, they doggedly refused to permit UN access to their guerilla zones and continually obstructed the peace process.
UN battalions were helpless in the face of Khmer Rouge attacks. As Widyono points out, the UN Transitional Authority of Cambodia (Untac) had to appeal to the forces of Hun Sen's government, not officially recognised by the UN, to come and chase the Khmer Rouge soldiers out of town.
Amazingly the treaty made no provision for how to deal with any faction that violated its accords, much less any contingency plan to protect Cambodian civilians from the genocidal Pol Pot. Ordinary Cambodians had assumed that UN forces had come to Cambodia to protect them. But UN senior officials pointed out to this reviewer "it was not part of our mandate". They even had difficulties protecting themselves.
This insider's account provides fresh insights into another major controversy. How far was Untac supposed to take over from the incumbent government led by Hun Sen? The book clarifies the complexities, illusions and realities of power in Cambodia.
The arrangement was extremely complex, with authority vested in Untac and King Norodom Sihanouk, then the president of the Supreme National Council. But neither body was equipped or prepared to run the country during the period of preparation for free and fair elections.
Widyono soon grasped that only the incumbent government, which had presided over the rebirth of Cambodia since the Pol Pot nightmare, had the capacity to do this. Guerilla factions and some western governments never wanted to accept that reality.
Untac also had its successes. A mass refugee repatriation emptied all the camps in Thailand and brought Cambodians home in time for voting day. Numerous NGOs were set up and the seeds of pluralism and a free press were successfully cultivated. The first democratic election in Cambodian history took place thanks to the bravery and dedication of hundreds of UN
volunteers. That the UN did not achieve more in the way of delivering peace and justice was primarily owing to the drafting of the mandate.
In his capacity as the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Widyono returned to Cambodia some years after the end of Untac's mission. The book ends in 1997 with Hun Sen emerging triumphant from a showdown with Royalist armed forces in a tank battle in Phnom Penh.
The UN had been forced to dance to many different tunes. Dancing in the shadows of the killing fields, Untac was mandated to promote respect for human rights, yet paradoxically it was not allowed to investigate the Khmer Rouge regime of mass murder. Respecting Pol Pot as part of an inclusive peace process was a tune dictated by the US, Britain, France and China in the Security Council, with reservations from Russia only.
The UN military commander, General John Sanderson, berated journalists one night for highlighting the genocidal record of the Khmer Rouge, instead of focusing on Untac's drive for reconciliation among the four factions.
But unlike the Australian general, the author concludes that including the Khmer Rouge in the peace agreement was a huge blunder. He argues that they should have been put on trial like those who committed atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and not coddled by the UN.
Now, so many years later, the UN is finally backing a Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Phnom Penh. It's better late than never.
Saturday, February 2, 2008
DANCING IN SHADOWS
Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia
By Benny Widyono
"Benny Widyono has written a lively, sometimes passionate and controversial book from the perspective of a fellow Southeast Asian who was also a senior UN official through Cambodia's crucial post–Cold War years. His account is rich in detail, from scenes of his own life and work in the devastated country to his insider's analyses of its troubled politics." —Barbara Crossette, Former New York Times correspondent in Southeast Asia and UN bureau chief
"Benny Widyono brings us the remarkable inside story of the UNTAC operations in Cambodia after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreements, as well as the intrigues, turmoil, and political upheavals of the first years of a reborn Cambodia. This book will be fascinating reading for anyone interested in the often tragic history of Cambodia and the history of big-power intervention in Southeast Asia." —Ali Alatas, Former foreign minister of Indonesia and co-chairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia
This fascinating book recounts the remarkable tale of a career UN official from Indonesia caught in the turmoil of international and domestic politics swirling around Cambodia during the tumultuous period after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Writing from his experience first as a member of the UN transitional authority and then as a personal envoy to the UN secretary-general, Benny Widyono re-creates the fierce battles for power centering on King Norodom Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and Prime Minister Hun Sen. A simultaneous insider and outsider, he also untangles the competing and conflicting agendas of the key international players, especially the United States, China, and Vietnam. He argues that great-power geopolitics throughout the cold war and post–cold war eras triggered and sustained a tragedy of enormous proportions in Cambodia for decades, ultimately leading to a flawed peace process.
Widyono tells the inside story of the massive UN operation in Cambodia, the largest and most challenging in the organization's history to that time and long considered a model for UN operations elsewhere. He draws not only on his vantage point as part of the UN bureaucracy, but also as a local UN official in the rural Cambodian province of Siem Reap, the site of Angkor Wat. As a fellow Southeast Asian with no geopolitical axe to grind, Widyono was able to win the respect of Cambodians, including the once and future king, Norodom Sihanouk, whose decline after fifty years as his country's leading figure is vividly portrayed. Putting a human face on international operations, this book will be invaluable reading for anyone interested in Southeast Asia, the role of international peacekeeping, and the international response to genocide.
About the Author
Benny Widyono, born in Indonesia to ethnic Chinese parents, was a career UN diplomat. He was a peacekeeper with UNTAC from 1992 to 1993 and representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia from 1994 to 1997. He holds a Ph.D. in economics and wrote this book while a visiting scholar at the Kahin Center on Advanced Research on Southeast Asia at Cornell University.
Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia
By Benny Widyono
"Benny Widyono has written a lively, sometimes passionate and controversial book from the perspective of a fellow Southeast Asian who was also a senior UN official through Cambodia's crucial post–Cold War years. His account is rich in detail, from scenes of his own life and work in the devastated country to his insider's analyses of its troubled politics." —Barbara Crossette, Former New York Times correspondent in Southeast Asia and UN bureau chief"Benny Widyono brings us the remarkable inside story of the UNTAC operations in Cambodia after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreements, as well as the intrigues, turmoil, and political upheavals of the first years of a reborn Cambodia. This book will be fascinating reading for anyone interested in the often tragic history of Cambodia and the history of big-power intervention in Southeast Asia." —Ali Alatas, Former foreign minister of Indonesia and co-chairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia
This fascinating book recounts the remarkable tale of a career UN official from Indonesia caught in the turmoil of international and domestic politics swirling around Cambodia during the tumultuous period after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Writing from his experience first as a member of the UN transitional authority and then as a personal envoy to the UN secretary-general, Benny Widyono re-creates the fierce battles for power centering on King Norodom Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and Prime Minister Hun Sen. A simultaneous insider and outsider, he also untangles the competing and conflicting agendas of the key international players, especially the United States, China, and Vietnam. He argues that great-power geopolitics throughout the cold war and post–cold war eras triggered and sustained a tragedy of enormous proportions in Cambodia for decades, ultimately leading to a flawed peace process.
Widyono tells the inside story of the massive UN operation in Cambodia, the largest and most challenging in the organization's history to that time and long considered a model for UN operations elsewhere. He draws not only on his vantage point as part of the UN bureaucracy, but also as a local UN official in the rural Cambodian province of Siem Reap, the site of Angkor Wat. As a fellow Southeast Asian with no geopolitical axe to grind, Widyono was able to win the respect of Cambodians, including the once and future king, Norodom Sihanouk, whose decline after fifty years as his country's leading figure is vividly portrayed. Putting a human face on international operations, this book will be invaluable reading for anyone interested in Southeast Asia, the role of international peacekeeping, and the international response to genocide.
About the Author
Benny Widyono, born in Indonesia to ethnic Chinese parents, was a career UN diplomat. He was a peacekeeper with UNTAC from 1992 to 1993 and representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia from 1994 to 1997. He holds a Ph.D. in economics and wrote this book while a visiting scholar at the Kahin Center on Advanced Research on Southeast Asia at Cornell University.
Friday, February 1, 2008
Review from The Advocate (Stamford, Connecticut)
Dancing in 'Shadows' Stamford professor writes about experiencees as UN official in Cambodia
By Scott Gargan
Special Correspondent
The Advocate (Stamford, Connecticut)
December 30 2007
Benny Widyono was talking by phone with his wife, Francisca, who was at home in Stamford, when a UN soldier screamed "get down!" Siem Reap, where the Indonesian diplomat served as provincial governor for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia - the peacekeeping mission deployed in 1992 after decades of civil war in the country - was under attack by the Khmer Rouge.
"They were fighting us with 900 people," says Widyono, who called his wife from a phone inside UNTAC's Australian communications unit. "She was up all night worrying about me."
Before their ouster by the Vietnamese-led People's Republic of Kampuchea in 1979, the KR starved or executed some 2 million of their own people in a four-year campaign to force Cambodia's population into agrarian labor communes. Now 14 years later, they were shelling Widyono's city in protest of UNTAC-coordinated elections.
Widyono admits he could have waited to call his wife. But, he says UNTAC "timidity" toward the KR - born out of a UN mandate recognizing the group as a legitimate administrative faction in Cambodia - gave them the audacity to strike in the first place.
"How can you recognize a genocidal regime? Without UN recognition, the KR wouldn't have been as confident," says Widyono, who discusses his experiences as part of UNTAC from 1992-1993 and later, as a UN special envoy to Cambodia from 1994-1997, in his memoir, "Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia."
As the title suggests, Widyono's narrative focuses on the role of what he calls the "unholy trinity" - King Norodom Sihanouk, the KR and the UN - in fomenting political chaos. Widyono writes how the UN refused to recognize the PRK, even though it freed Cambodia's citizens and worked to rehabilitate the country. Instead, it was slapped with economic sanctions (withholding aid for thousands) and denied representation at the UN.
Those seats, Widyono says, were kept for representatives of the Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea - comprised of the KR and other anti-Vietnamese groups - at the behest of western nations like the United States. Rather than support Cambodia's de facto rulers or leave the UN seat open, Widyono explains, the West backed a powerless government in exile - all because the PRK was installed by Vietnam's communist government, a hated enemy of the United States in the Cold War.
"It's like letting Hitler represent Germany at the UN," Widyono said during a Dec. 11 lecture at the University of Connecticut in Stamford, where he teaches economics. "Did anyone ask the Cambodian people who they wanted to represent them?"
On the ground, this meant Widyono and his UNTAC colleagues could not disarm Cambodia's warring factions (the KR was non-compliant) or protect civilians from the KR's pre-election violence.
Widyono says his comments have "raised eyebrows" at the UN, which views UNTAC as an overall success for its organization of elections and repatriation of refugees. He still believes UNTAC's mission was fundamentally flawed.
"The Paris Peace agreements (ending the civil war) were born with original sin because UNTAC had to recognize the KR," says Widyono, who wrote the book during a three-year stint as a visiting scholar at the Kahin Center for Advanced Research in Southeast Asia at Cornell University. "Our mandate was a joke."
Oddly enough, Widyono didn't hear complaints from Cambodia's ostentatious King Sihanouk, whom he criticized for backing the KR. He was surprised to receive a thank-you note from Sihanouk for the copy of "Dancing..." he sent to the former king for his birthday.
"I was quite critical of him, so I wasn't sure if he would like the book," says Widyono. "But he likes to have his name mentioned everywhere and my book revives him. He is even in the title."
Widyono may be firm in his criticisms of UNTAC and pessimistic about the UN, but he still thinks there can be lessons for future missions, such as the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur.
"The UN is constrained because they don't have their own troops," Widyono says. "But that doesn't mean they can't stand up to those who have committed atrocities."
By Scott Gargan
Special Correspondent
The Advocate (Stamford, Connecticut)
December 30 2007
Benny Widyono was talking by phone with his wife, Francisca, who was at home in Stamford, when a UN soldier screamed "get down!" Siem Reap, where the Indonesian diplomat served as provincial governor for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia - the peacekeeping mission deployed in 1992 after decades of civil war in the country - was under attack by the Khmer Rouge.
"They were fighting us with 900 people," says Widyono, who called his wife from a phone inside UNTAC's Australian communications unit. "She was up all night worrying about me."
Before their ouster by the Vietnamese-led People's Republic of Kampuchea in 1979, the KR starved or executed some 2 million of their own people in a four-year campaign to force Cambodia's population into agrarian labor communes. Now 14 years later, they were shelling Widyono's city in protest of UNTAC-coordinated elections.
Widyono admits he could have waited to call his wife. But, he says UNTAC "timidity" toward the KR - born out of a UN mandate recognizing the group as a legitimate administrative faction in Cambodia - gave them the audacity to strike in the first place.
"How can you recognize a genocidal regime? Without UN recognition, the KR wouldn't have been as confident," says Widyono, who discusses his experiences as part of UNTAC from 1992-1993 and later, as a UN special envoy to Cambodia from 1994-1997, in his memoir, "Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia."
As the title suggests, Widyono's narrative focuses on the role of what he calls the "unholy trinity" - King Norodom Sihanouk, the KR and the UN - in fomenting political chaos. Widyono writes how the UN refused to recognize the PRK, even though it freed Cambodia's citizens and worked to rehabilitate the country. Instead, it was slapped with economic sanctions (withholding aid for thousands) and denied representation at the UN.
Those seats, Widyono says, were kept for representatives of the Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea - comprised of the KR and other anti-Vietnamese groups - at the behest of western nations like the United States. Rather than support Cambodia's de facto rulers or leave the UN seat open, Widyono explains, the West backed a powerless government in exile - all because the PRK was installed by Vietnam's communist government, a hated enemy of the United States in the Cold War.
"It's like letting Hitler represent Germany at the UN," Widyono said during a Dec. 11 lecture at the University of Connecticut in Stamford, where he teaches economics. "Did anyone ask the Cambodian people who they wanted to represent them?"
On the ground, this meant Widyono and his UNTAC colleagues could not disarm Cambodia's warring factions (the KR was non-compliant) or protect civilians from the KR's pre-election violence.
Widyono says his comments have "raised eyebrows" at the UN, which views UNTAC as an overall success for its organization of elections and repatriation of refugees. He still believes UNTAC's mission was fundamentally flawed.
"The Paris Peace agreements (ending the civil war) were born with original sin because UNTAC had to recognize the KR," says Widyono, who wrote the book during a three-year stint as a visiting scholar at the Kahin Center for Advanced Research in Southeast Asia at Cornell University. "Our mandate was a joke."
Oddly enough, Widyono didn't hear complaints from Cambodia's ostentatious King Sihanouk, whom he criticized for backing the KR. He was surprised to receive a thank-you note from Sihanouk for the copy of "Dancing..." he sent to the former king for his birthday.
"I was quite critical of him, so I wasn't sure if he would like the book," says Widyono. "But he likes to have his name mentioned everywhere and my book revives him. He is even in the title."
Widyono may be firm in his criticisms of UNTAC and pessimistic about the UN, but he still thinks there can be lessons for future missions, such as the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur.
"The UN is constrained because they don't have their own troops," Widyono says. "But that doesn't mean they can't stand up to those who have committed atrocities."
David Chandler's Review
Shadow Boxing
The anxious exhilarating UNTAC days: Successes and failures. Reviewed by David Chandler
Phnom Penh Post
Issue 16 / 24
November 30 — December 13, 2007
Benny Widyono, Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia. xxxii+ 312 pp. Foreword by Ben Kiernan., Lanham and Boulder, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
The sub-title of this absorbing memoir promises more than the book is able to deliver. Dr Benny Widyono, a career official with the United Nations, has very little to say about Sihanouk or the Khmer Rouge as long-term political phenomena. He also fails to summarize the multi-faceted activities of the UN in Cambodia since the early 1990s.
Instead, what we are given and should be grateful for is an insightful record of a tumultuous period of Cambodian history in which Widyono was an astute participant-observer. Between 1992 and 1997 Widyono worked with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and as the UN Secretary General's special representative in Phnom Penh. These positions allowed him to observe the UNTAC operation and the unfolding opera of Cambodian politics at close range. Fourteen photographs and seven maps enhance his appealing text.
Widyono arrived in Phnom Penh in April l992 and soon became aware, as many did, that the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, which had established UNTAC, had barely papered over irreconcilable differences among the powers that signed them. They had also set unachievable agendas and ignored the animosities of the Cambodian political actors.
The Accords, Widyono reminds us, also placed some heavy burdens on the UNTAC operation. The first of these, pressed by the United States, China and their allies, was that the Democratic Kampuchean "faction" was to play a legitimate role in Cambodian politics. To smooth the path, references to "genocide" or the other horrors of the Khmer Rouge era were whited out of the Accords.
Secondly, the Accords enjoined UNTAC to oversee the day-to-day governance of Cambodia, an impossible task for people who knew next to nothing about the country, had little experience with such tasks and had no full time employees who were fluent in Khmer. In any case, those who held power in the country, namely the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia (SOC) were unwilling to relinquish it to the UN.
Finally, the four factions in Cambodian politics who had been roped together to form a Supreme National Council (SNC) despised each other and had no interest in working constructively together or in allowing UNTAC to succeed. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, at the apex of the SNC, distrusted the factions and hoped to negotiate some power for himself.
With understandable trepidation, therefore, the largest UN operation in its history got underway, damaged at birth by conflicting mandates, exaggerated hopes, UN inexperience and intransigent, suspicious political actors.
In June 1992, Benny Widyono became the UN's "shadow governor" in Siem Reap. He had asked for this challenging job in New York, and for the next 13 months he performed a multitude of tasks in the run up to the elections with inventiveness and brio. The chapters that deal with this period stylishly convey the ups and downs of those anxious, exhilarating times.
In judging the UNTAC experience, Widyono agrees with most observers that its successes lay in the fields of refugee repatriation and organizing the elections.
He locates UNTAC shortcomings in the areas of disarmament, governance and its timidity vis-a- vis the Khmer Rouge.
Disarmament failed because the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, triggering the SOC's refusal to follow suit. These refusals guaranteed the continuation of warfare between the two, which lasted until the Khmer Rouge movement collapsed in 1997-1998.
Governance never worked because UNTAC was unable to administer the country, and because the SOC and the Khmer Rouge (the factions controlling Cambodian territory) never relinquished any administrative control.
UNTAC's timidity sprang from the fact that none of the participating powers (except, perhaps, the French) were willing to take the casualties they feared might be inflicted on them by the Khmer Rouge.
In the elections of May 1993, more voters voted for the royalist faction, FUNCINPEC, than for the Cambodian Peoples' Party (CPP), which had governed Cambodia since 1979. For the first time in Cambodian history, a majority of the population peacefully rejected the political status quo. What they expected or hoped for in its place was unclear. In any case, the SOC refused to accept to results of the election and for a few days the entire UNTAC operation seemed destined to collapse.
At this point Sihanouk, encouraged by the French, engineered a bizarre political arrangement whereby FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to enter a power sharing relationship with Hun Sen as the "second" prime minister, alongside the "first" prime minister Sihanouk's son, Prince Rannaridh, the chairman of FUNCINPEC.
Widyono returned to New York in late 1993, but became impatient with bureaucratic work, and in April l994 came back to Phnom Penh as the UN Secretary General's personal representative, tasked with monitoring the aftermath of UNTAC. The "national interest" of the UN is hard to define, but the position gave Widyono an ideal vantage point from which to observe the Rannaridh-Hun Sen "alliance" and the first few years of the newly renamed Kingdom of Cambodia. His assessments of personalities and events in this period are often shrewd and persuasive, and buttressed by observations made in the course of later visits to the country. Cambodia watchers will be aware that most of the problems raised in the book remain unsolved and most of the political actors in 1993-1997 remain on stage, so Dancing in Shadows has an up-to-date "feel". Widyono left in April l997, shortly before the "events " of July, so his reportage on them is necessarily second-hand.
Throughout the memoir, Widyono's writing is brisk, perceptive and accessible, although it's marred here and there by small historical gaffes and typographical errors. On balance, his insider's narrative is a valuable addition to literature about Cambodia's recent past.
David Chandler is the author of Brother Number One: A biography of Pol Pot and other books about Cambodia. He is currently affiliated with Monash University in Australia.
On sale at Monument Books
The anxious exhilarating UNTAC days: Successes and failures. Reviewed by David Chandler
Phnom Penh Post
Issue 16 / 24
November 30 — December 13, 2007
Benny Widyono, Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia. xxxii+ 312 pp. Foreword by Ben Kiernan., Lanham and Boulder, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
The sub-title of this absorbing memoir promises more than the book is able to deliver. Dr Benny Widyono, a career official with the United Nations, has very little to say about Sihanouk or the Khmer Rouge as long-term political phenomena. He also fails to summarize the multi-faceted activities of the UN in Cambodia since the early 1990s.
Instead, what we are given and should be grateful for is an insightful record of a tumultuous period of Cambodian history in which Widyono was an astute participant-observer. Between 1992 and 1997 Widyono worked with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and as the UN Secretary General's special representative in Phnom Penh. These positions allowed him to observe the UNTAC operation and the unfolding opera of Cambodian politics at close range. Fourteen photographs and seven maps enhance his appealing text.
Widyono arrived in Phnom Penh in April l992 and soon became aware, as many did, that the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, which had established UNTAC, had barely papered over irreconcilable differences among the powers that signed them. They had also set unachievable agendas and ignored the animosities of the Cambodian political actors.
The Accords, Widyono reminds us, also placed some heavy burdens on the UNTAC operation. The first of these, pressed by the United States, China and their allies, was that the Democratic Kampuchean "faction" was to play a legitimate role in Cambodian politics. To smooth the path, references to "genocide" or the other horrors of the Khmer Rouge era were whited out of the Accords.
Secondly, the Accords enjoined UNTAC to oversee the day-to-day governance of Cambodia, an impossible task for people who knew next to nothing about the country, had little experience with such tasks and had no full time employees who were fluent in Khmer. In any case, those who held power in the country, namely the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia (SOC) were unwilling to relinquish it to the UN.
Finally, the four factions in Cambodian politics who had been roped together to form a Supreme National Council (SNC) despised each other and had no interest in working constructively together or in allowing UNTAC to succeed. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, at the apex of the SNC, distrusted the factions and hoped to negotiate some power for himself.
With understandable trepidation, therefore, the largest UN operation in its history got underway, damaged at birth by conflicting mandates, exaggerated hopes, UN inexperience and intransigent, suspicious political actors.
In June 1992, Benny Widyono became the UN's "shadow governor" in Siem Reap. He had asked for this challenging job in New York, and for the next 13 months he performed a multitude of tasks in the run up to the elections with inventiveness and brio. The chapters that deal with this period stylishly convey the ups and downs of those anxious, exhilarating times.
In judging the UNTAC experience, Widyono agrees with most observers that its successes lay in the fields of refugee repatriation and organizing the elections.
He locates UNTAC shortcomings in the areas of disarmament, governance and its timidity vis-a- vis the Khmer Rouge.
Disarmament failed because the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, triggering the SOC's refusal to follow suit. These refusals guaranteed the continuation of warfare between the two, which lasted until the Khmer Rouge movement collapsed in 1997-1998.
Governance never worked because UNTAC was unable to administer the country, and because the SOC and the Khmer Rouge (the factions controlling Cambodian territory) never relinquished any administrative control.
UNTAC's timidity sprang from the fact that none of the participating powers (except, perhaps, the French) were willing to take the casualties they feared might be inflicted on them by the Khmer Rouge.
In the elections of May 1993, more voters voted for the royalist faction, FUNCINPEC, than for the Cambodian Peoples' Party (CPP), which had governed Cambodia since 1979. For the first time in Cambodian history, a majority of the population peacefully rejected the political status quo. What they expected or hoped for in its place was unclear. In any case, the SOC refused to accept to results of the election and for a few days the entire UNTAC operation seemed destined to collapse.
At this point Sihanouk, encouraged by the French, engineered a bizarre political arrangement whereby FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to enter a power sharing relationship with Hun Sen as the "second" prime minister, alongside the "first" prime minister Sihanouk's son, Prince Rannaridh, the chairman of FUNCINPEC.
Widyono returned to New York in late 1993, but became impatient with bureaucratic work, and in April l994 came back to Phnom Penh as the UN Secretary General's personal representative, tasked with monitoring the aftermath of UNTAC. The "national interest" of the UN is hard to define, but the position gave Widyono an ideal vantage point from which to observe the Rannaridh-Hun Sen "alliance" and the first few years of the newly renamed Kingdom of Cambodia. His assessments of personalities and events in this period are often shrewd and persuasive, and buttressed by observations made in the course of later visits to the country. Cambodia watchers will be aware that most of the problems raised in the book remain unsolved and most of the political actors in 1993-1997 remain on stage, so Dancing in Shadows has an up-to-date "feel". Widyono left in April l997, shortly before the "events " of July, so his reportage on them is necessarily second-hand.
Throughout the memoir, Widyono's writing is brisk, perceptive and accessible, although it's marred here and there by small historical gaffes and typographical errors. On balance, his insider's narrative is a valuable addition to literature about Cambodia's recent past.
David Chandler is the author of Brother Number One: A biography of Pol Pot and other books about Cambodia. He is currently affiliated with Monash University in Australia.
On sale at Monument Books
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